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I. THE CAST OF CHARACfERS 
Thomas Tobias, Ralph Hubert ("Sonny") Barger, Richard Wayne 
Mummert, Kenneth Musslyn, and J. Wilton Hunt have much in 
common. 
Tobias was convicted in Mobile, Alabama of conspiracy to manufac-
ture and possess Phencyclidine (PCP).1 Actually, he wanted to manufac-
ture cocaine but, with no prior background in such production, was 
unable to do so.2 An undercover drug enforcement officer, pretending 
to manage a chemical plant that had been advertised in High Times . 
* © 1996 by Paul Marcus. 
** Haynes Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, and author of The 
Entrapment Defense (The Michie Co. 1995, 2d ed.). Earlier versions of portions of this Article 
were presented to seminars at the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Florida 
and the University of Southern California. The comments of the faculty and students at these 
schools were extremely helpful. Professors Walter Felton, Sheri Johnson, Fredric Lederer, and 
Richard Williamson shared their thoughtful observations in the area. 
1. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 384 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 
1108 (1982). 
2. Jd. at 383. 
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Magazine, suggested to Tobias that he make PCP.3 The agent sent 
Tobias everything necessary to do so, and then spoke with Tobias more 
than a dozen times to discuss problems encountered in the manufactur-
ing process.4 Tobias was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.5 
The "recognized leader of the Hells Angels," Sonny Barger was 
investigated over a long period of time.6 As part of the investigation, 
an FBI informant infiltrated the Anchorage, Alaska chapter of the Hells 
Angels.7 In response to the killing of two Hells Angels, allegedly by 
members of a rival group known as the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, 
Barger and others spoke of retaliation against the Outlaws. 8 The 
government informant was an active participant in the discussions and 
encouraged Barger to travel to Alaska to talk further about retaliation. 
Moreover, the informant flew all over the country, at government 
expense, to meet with various members of the Hells Angels.9 As the 
court itself observed, "[t]he government did to an extent control the 
[retaliatory] scheme."10 The informant told Barger about a plan to blow 
up the Outlaws' clubhouse, and explained how an explosion would kill 
five or six people. 11 Barger was pleased with the retaliation plan which 
developed. 12 Subsequently, Barger was convicted in Louisville of 
conspiracy to violate explosives and firearms laws. 13 
The situation involving Richard Wayne Mummert was an unusual 
one. He owned a Ford dealership at which an undercover agent secured 
a job.14 Mummert, who had difficult business problems, had been 
forced to relocate his dealership and needed $1.2 million for a new 
facility. 15 He was unable to obtain such funds. 16 The government agent 
informed Mummert that a loan for the $1.2 million could be arranged 
through the agent's father, who was supposed to be on the board of 
3. !d. 
4. !d. at 383-84. 
5. !d. at 384. 
6. United States v. Barger, 931 F.2d 359, 361-62 (6th Cir. 1991). 
7. !d. 
8. !d. 
9. !d. 
10. !d. at 364. 
11. !d. at 362. 
12. !d. 
13. !d. at 361. 
14. United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 
u.s. 926 (1978). 
15. !d. 
16. !d. 
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directors of a bank.17 The agent further informed Mummert that the 
money was "dirty," because no taxes had been paid on it.18 Mummert 
indicated he would "launder" the money through a friend's contacts in 
Mexico in connection with a heroin operation. 19 Mummert, in the 
words of the government agent, "indicated initial reluctance to becoming 
involved in the heroin transaction" but then agreed to participate.20 
Mter numerous meetings over several months with undercover 
government agents, Mummert was arrested and ultimately convicted in 
.San Diego of distributing heroin and conspiring to do so.21 
Kenneth Musslyn faced a government operation22 strikingly similar 
to that involved in the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson v. United 
State? just a few years later.24 The investigation involving Musslyn 
took place over a period of more than five years.25 The Postal Service 
created an undercover operation to investigate illegal mailings of child 
pornography.26 Musslyn was sent an application by "Crusaders for 
Sexual Freedom,'m an organization created by the Postal Service. He 
filled it out and indicated interest in sexual material involving pre-teen 
children.28 Later a postal agent contacted Musslyn claiming she was a 
member of the organization and a collector of hard-to-find erotic photos 
and films; she told him she wanted to find someone with whom to 
trade. 29 Correspondence between tlie two took place for more than a 
year.3° Finally, Musslyn met the agent at a bar in Kansas City, reiterat-
ed his interest, and agreed to correspond further with the agent.31 Three 
years after his initial application to the "Crusaders" was completed, 
Musslyn submitted an application to still another undercover postal 
17. ld. at 1331-32. 
18. Id. at 1332. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1331-33., 
22. United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 443 
(1993). 
23. 503 u.s. 540 (1992). 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 51-56. 
25. Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 946. 
26. Id. at 945. 
27. ld. 
28. Id. at 945-46. 
29. Id. at 946. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. During the investigation, Musslyn entered a plea of guilty to charges arising out 
of an unrelated incident where he was photographed having oral sex with a 13-year-old girl. Id. 
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organization, the "American Hedonist Society."32 Finally, in response 
to a brochure offering photographs of children involved in sexually 
explicit conduct, Musslyn ordered illegal photographs and enclosed a 
check.33 Delivery of a parcel containing the photographs was made to 
Musslyn in Raytown, Missouri.34 Immediately thereafter, Musslyn was 
arrested and later convicted of unlawfully receiving child pornogra-
phy.3s 
In some ways the most interesting person of the bunch is J. Wilton 
Hunt who, at the time of his prosecution, was a district judge in the 
state of North Carolina.36 He was convicted under RICO for conspiring 
to engage in racketeering activities.37 His conviction resulted from a 
two-year undercover investigation of public corruption in Columbus 
County, North Carolina.38 It was directed against Hunt in response to 
a statement by a local criminal that he could bribe the judge. 39 The 
efforts at bribery under the government's supervision were unsuccessful, 
but the agents were introduced to another individual who claimed to be 
acquainted with Hunt.40 This second person then sought out Hunt.41 
After a series of meetings, the judge agreed to accept $1500 a month to 
"protect" .what was to be an illegal gambling operation.42 Initially, he 
took $1000 in cash from the government informer but stated that "he 
had never taken money before and found it difficult" to do so, and 
suggested "that the money be considered a 'campaign contribution.' "43 
Monthly payments were made over a period of several months.44 
These five men may not be instantly recognizable even to sophisti-
cated judges and criminal law specialists. However, Joseph George 
Sherman and Keith Jacobson are quite well known to observers of the 
American criminal justice system. Sherman was at a doctor's office 
being treated for narcotics addiction when he met Kalchinian, a 
32. !d. 
33. !d. 
34. !d. 
35. !d. at 945. 
36. United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1079 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
1018 (1985). 
37. /d. at 1079 (referring to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963). 
38. /d. at 1080. 
39. /d. 
40. /d. 
41. /d. 
42. /d. at 1081. 
43. /d. 
44. !d. at 1086. 
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government informer.45 Several accidental meetings followed and their 
conversations moved to a discussion of mutual experiences and 
problems in seeking to overcome their addictions.46 Kalchinian asked 
Sherman if he knew of a good source of narcotics and pleaded with 
Sherman on several occasions to supply him with drugs because he was 
not reacting positively to treatment.47 Sherman consistently tried to 
avoid responding, but he finally agreed to get narcotics for 
Kalchinian.48 Later, government agents observed Sherman give narcot-
ics to Kalchinian on several occasions.49 Sherman was convicted in 
federal court of the sale of narcotics.50 
As with Musslyn, Jacobson was convicted of receiving through the 
mails illegal materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit 
conduct.51 He, too, was the subject of an intense postal service investi-
gation that lasted over two years.52 Finally, as with Musslyn, the 
government-created organizations wrote Jacobson on many occasions to 
probe his interest in child pornography .53 The names of two of the 
front organizations in this case were the ubiquitous "American Hedonist 
Society" and .the "Heartland Institute for a New Tomorrow."54 During 
the investigation, Jacobson was contacted numerous times by agents 
purportedly to determine his interest in protecting sexual freedom.55 In 
one letter to Jacobson the government officer raised some provocative 
points: 
"As many of you know, much hysterical nonsense has 
appeared in the American media concerning 'pornography' 
and what must be done to stop it from coming across your 
borders. This brief letter does not allow us to give much 
comments; however, why is your government spending 
45. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958). 
46. /d. 
47. /d. 
48. /d. 
49. /d. 
50. /d. at 370. Sherman was convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952), the predecessor of 
the current fedeml narcotics statutes. 
51. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 542 (1992). Jacobson was convicted of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A), a section of the Child Protection Act of 1984 which 
criminalizes " 'visual depiction [that] involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.' " /d. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A)) (altemtion by Jacobson Court). 
52. Id. at 543-47. 
53. Id. at 543-45. 
54. /d. at 543-44. 
55. /d. at 544-45. 
210 FWRIDA lAW REVIEW 
millions of dollars to exercise international censorship while 
tons of drugs, which makes yours the world's most crime 
ridden country are passed through easily."56 
[Vol. 47 
Seven individuals, each with a different story. Yet, at the outset, I 
mentioned that they all have much in common. What could that possibly 
be? All were convicted of different crimes, by different courts, in 
different locations, and all were sentenced to different terms of 
imprisonment. These cases all share important characteristics. First, 
these cases actually existed. Federal law enforcement officers truly did 
use resources, time, and energy to target these prosecutions and set up 
long-term sting operations in order to achieve convictions of individuals, 
some of whom were not already engaged in criminal activity. Second, 
the defendant in each of these cases raised a claim of entrapment.57 
Third, these cases demonstrate the difficulty of prevailing when 
entrapment is raised as a defense. Except for Sherman and Jacobson, the 
defendants lost on their entrapment defenses.58 
Perhaps it is not overly surprising that between 1977 and 1991 these 
entrapment arguments proved unsuccessful. In each conviction, the 
defense was rejected because the defendant failed the prevailing 
subjective test for entrapment. Each was found to have been predisposed 
toward criminal activity. The Tobias court observed: 
Tobias responded to a simple advertisement offering the 
over-the-counter sale of chemicals which could be pur-
chased without any difficulty in chemical houses in Mobile, 
Alabama. This advertisement served only to provide one so 
56. /d. at 546 (quoting letter to Jacobson). 
57. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 37Q-71; Barger, 931 F.2d at 365-66; 
Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 946 (referring to the "Outrageous Government Conduct" defense); Hunt, 
749 F.2d at 1080; Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384; Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1334. 
58. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554 (reversing Jacobson's conviction because the government 
failed to "adduce evidence to support the jury verdict that [Jacobson] was predisposed, 
independent of the Government's acts"); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373 (finding entrapment as a 
matter of law); Barger, 931 F.2d at 367 (rejecting Barger's "argument that his conviction for 
conspiracy should be reversed because of government entrapment"); Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 947 
(finding the government's conduct insufficiently outrageous or fundamentally unfair as to bar 
Musslyn's prosecution because Musslyn was clearly predisposed to collect child pornography 
and engage in sexual acts with children); Hunt, 149 F.2d at 1087 (finding the evidence 
"sufficient for the jury to find the requisite predisposition and to reject the entrapment defense"); 
Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384-85 (affirming district court's refusal to grant a judgment of acquittal 
based on an entrapment defense); Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1338 (finding Mummert was not 
entrapped as a matter of law). 
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disposed the opportunity to obtain the necessary precursors 
and equipment to manufacture controlled substances. Tobias 
seized this opportunity by writing the supply company for 
"more information" and telephoning the supply company on 
many occasions to place and check on his order. The DEA 
did nothing else to solicit Tobias's business.59 
211 
Barger, as acknowledged head of the Hells Angels,60 was hardly an 
innocent. He "discussed retaliation many times with various members 
of the Hells Angels . . . [and he] evidenced no reluctance to become 
involved in the conspiracy ... [and] expressed interest and pleasure in 
[the plan's] retaliatory nature."61 Mummert, too, was not a hesitant 
catch, as he "was willing to do almost anything to obtain the [$1.2 
million]."62 Musslyn, in the words of the appeals court, "was clearly 
predisposed to order child pomography,"63 and the learned judge, 
defendant Hunt, "never demonstrated any desire to withdraw from the 
protection scheme until his name had been publicly linked to criminal 
activities several months later."64 
Sherman and Jacobson also lost at the triallevel.65 However, they 
became prominent figures because their appeals resulted in the two most 
significant United States Supreme Court decisions on entrapment law, 
Sherman v. United States66 and United States v. Jacobson.61 
After Sherman was decided in 1958, there had been great hope for 
the entrapment defense. For more than thirty years, however, it seemed 
to be dying,68 especially in the federal courts.69 In 1992, the Jacobson 
decision resurrected the defense. To be sure, the defense is now so 
vibrant that the outcomes for Tobias, Barger, Mummert, Musslyn, and 
Hunt might well be different if they were charged today. 
59. Tobias, 662 F.2d at 385. 
60. Barger, 931 F.2d at 361. 
61. /d. at 367. 
62. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1338. 
63. Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 946. 
64. Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1086. The court went on to explain that "more visible qualms could 
have been expected from a public servant of reasonable rectitude who had been led astray." /d. 
65. Shennan, 356 U.S. at 372; Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542. 
66. 356 u.s. 369 (1958). 
67. 503 u.s. 540 (1992). 
68. See discussion in Paul Marcus, Proving Entrapment Under the Predisposition Test, 
14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 53 (1987). 
69. The defense fared better in the state courts as a general matter, particularly in those 
states which adopted the so-called objective test. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
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But, we move too quickly. The goal here is to determine the current 
viability of the defense, and to predict where the defense is likely to 
move in light of judges' responses to the Supreme Court's broad opinion 
in Jacobson. It is appropriate to begin with a brief discussion of some 
key non-issues, so that the stage can properly be set for the defining 
matter, the great change which is being seen in the application of the 
entrapment defense. 
II. NON-ISSUES IN ENTRAPMENT LAW 
Many questions surround the entrapment defense. Some of these 
questions, while important, are not germane to the subject matter of this 
Article. The first is the impressive experimentation with the defense by 
a number of states.70 Some states utilize an objective analysis which 
focuses exclusively on government behavior, not looking at all to the 
predisposition of the defendant.71 Others use a similar test, but allow 
some subjective evidence with regard to the defendant's own situation72 
or even evidence as to her state of mind.73 Still others combine the 
subjective and objective analyses by judicial determination,74 by 
70. Both federal and state courts have repeatedly emphasized that the entrapment defense 
is not constitutionally based, so states and Congress are free to adopt their own versions of the 
defense. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,433 (1973). 
71. For a good discussion of the origins of the objective test and the manner in which it 
differs from the subjective approach, see Commonwealth v. Lucci, 662 A.2d 1, 1-4 (Pa. 1995) 
(tracing the objective test and its emphasis from its origins in Sherman to its current codification 
in Pennsylvania statutory Jaw). California is one of the leading jurisdictions in formulating this 
so-called objective test. Its standard asks what the effect of the government inducement "would 
have [been] on a normally law-abiding person situated in the circumstances of the case at hand." 
People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979). As stated by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 
State v. Agrabante, 830 P.2d 492, 499 (Haw. 1992) (quoting State v. Anderson, 572 P.2d 159, 
162 (Haw. 1977)), the "dispositive" question is whether the police action "was so extreme that 
it created a substantial risk that persons not ready to commit the offense alleged [being] 
persuaded or induced to commit it." 
72. People v. Juillet, 475 N.W.2d 786, 793 (Mich. 1991) (stating that the "circumstances 
of the particular defendant may be considered by the trial court in analyzing the ready and 
willing component of the objective entrapment test"). 
73. England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 909-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (adopting a mixed 
subjective/objective test based on elements of inducement or persuasion). 
74. In New Mexico the judge makes an initial determination and if the judge concludes 
that reasonable minds could differ as to whether there was misconduct on the part of state 
agents, exceeding standards of proper investigation, then the question is sent to the jury. See 
State v. Sheetz, 825 P.2d 614, 619 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991). The Minnesota procedure is unique. 
The defendant there can choose to have the entrapment defense resolved by the judge at a 
pretrial hearing or by the jury at trial. See State v. Grilli, 230 N.W.2d 445, 455 (Minn. 1975). 
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statute,75 or by a blend of state constitutional principles and statutory 
enactments.76 Indeed, even in jurisdictions where courts follow the lead 
of the United States Supreme Court in the entrapment area, some 
interesting developments have occurred.77 But exploring the various 
state applications of the entrapment defense goes beyond the issues 
being discussed here. 
This Article also does not review the fundamental debate over the 
two entrapment tests. The first test, as mentioned previously, is referred 
to as the objective analysis.78 It is utilized in some form by about a 
third of the states, and is strongly supported by commentators and study 
commissions.79 The objective test looks to law enforcement behavior 
in determining whether the courts should intervene to limit inappropriate 
governmental behavior.80 The key question is whether _the official 
action was likely to cause an average, law abiding citizen to commit a 
crime.81 " 
The second test, adopted by the Supreme Court, rejects the objective 
view of entrapment law. Instead, its subjective analysis traditionally has 
75. For a discussion of the combination as passed by the New Jersey legislature, see State 
v. Rockholt, 476 A.2d 1236 (N.J. 1984). 
76. See Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1993) (finding that while a subsequent 
statutorily-adopted subjective standard eliminated a judicially-adopted objective standard, the 
legislature could not prohibit the judiciary from objectively reviewing the issue of entrapment 
to the extent that such a review involved issues of due.process under the Florida Constitution). 
77. Mississippi follows the subjective test but its courts have held a defendant can show 
entrapment as a matter of law if she demonstrates that the government both supplied illegal 
substances and then bought them back from her. See Bosarge v. State, 594 So. 2d 1143, 1146 
(Miss. 1991) (stating that this type of activity "is a form of official misconduct which must be 
condemned and that, absent a substantial and overriding showing of the defendant's predisposi-
tion for drug trafficking," the defendant must be acquitted). The United States Supreme Court 
in Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) reached the opposite conclusion. 
78. See supra text accompanying note 71. 
79. The Model Penal Code adopted an objective test, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962), as did the National Commission on the Reform of Federal 
Criminal Laws. FiNAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAWS § 702(2) (Proposed New Federal Criminal Code 1971). Most commentators, 
too, have taken this view. But see Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 
163, 170 (1976) (in which the author argues that the subjective analysis, or federal defense, is 
preferable to the objective analysis, or hypothetical-person defense). For a long list of articles 
supporting the objective test, see id. at 167 n.l3. Furthermore, as stated by the National 
Commission on the Study of a New Criminal Code: 'The defense is treated primarily as a curb 
upon improper law enforcement techniques, to which the predisposition of the particular 
defendant is irrelevant" STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE§ 702 cmt (1970). 
80. See, e.g., Agrabante, 830 P.2d at 449. 
81. See, e.g., Barraza, 591 P.2d at 955. 
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focused almost entirely on the defendant's predisposition to commit the 
crime.82 Debate concerning the two tests is over at the Supreme Court 
level.83 The last proponent of the objective test, Justice Brennan, 
conceded the point in 1988.84 No member of the Court today expressly 
supports the objective view.85 
Finally, this Article will not consider the issue of due process 
violations stemming from government overreaching. A court's displea-
sure with the extent of government involvement in the creation and 
development of crime can be dispositive,86 still the due process issue 
is decidedly distinct from the underlying entrapment question. 87 
82. See, e.g., Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488-89 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 
423, 429 (1973)). 
83. The debate was furious over an extended period of time. See, for instance, the 
exchanges between Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435 (1932); Chief Justice Warren and Justice Frankfurter in Shennan, 356 U.S. at 369; 
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); and Justices 
Rehnquist and Brennan in Hampton, 425 U.S. at 484. 
84. In Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1988), Justice Brennan stated the 
following: 
I join the Court's opinion. I write separately only because I have previously joined 
or written four opinions dissenting from this Court's holdings that the defendant's 
predisposition is relevant to the entrapment defense. Although some governmental 
misconduct might be sufficiently egregious to violate due process, my differences 
with the Court have been based on statutory interpretation and federal common 
law, not on the Constitution. Were I judging on a clean slate, I would still be 
inclined to adopt the view that the entrapment defense should focus exclusively on 
the Government's conduct. But I am not writing on a clean slate; the Court has 
spoken definitively on this point. Therefore I bow to stare decisis, and today join 
the judgment and reasoning of the Court. 
/d. (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
85. Jacobson marked the first time this century that the Supreme Court considered the 
issue of entrapment without mentioning the debate over the two tests. 
86. For a detailed discussion of the due process claim in connection with entrapment, see 
Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases, The Journey Back, 27 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 457 (1990). 
87. As noted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: 
[The due process claim] differs from entrapment: whereas the entrapment defense 
focuses on the state of mind of the defendant as it relates to his predisposition to 
commit the offense charged, the defense of "outrageous government conduct" 
recognizes that "extreme cases may arise where the government's conduct is so 
outrageous as to violate due process, even though the evidence permitted the jury 
to find that the defendant was predisposed." 
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While all of these issues are important, the most compelling today 
is the application of the majority's subjective standard for the entrap-
ment defendant. The key inquiry is into the manner in which a 
defendant's "predisposition" to commit crimes is to be decided and by 
whom. The fundamental consideration, usually made as a question of 
fact by the jury,88 is whether " 'prior to the initial contact by govern-
ment agents' " the defendant was disposed to commit a crime.89 In 
addition, it must be decided whether the government induced the 
defendant by creating " 'a substantial risk that an undisposed person or 
otherwise law-abiding citizen [committed] the offense.' "90 
The central determination of predisposition may appear far easier to 
make than it actually is. Individuals can be involved with complex 
transactions taking place over lengthy periods of time. The process is 
truly a tough one because the focus is on the defendant's state of mind 
at a particular time. Moreover, triers of fact may be strongly- influenced 
by looking to the type of person recruited by the government in order 
to complete the transaction. The dilemma was well stated by one court: 
"It is simply naive to suppose that public officials, or other defendants, 
can be neatly divided between the pure of heart and those with a 
'criminal' outlook."91 But it is this determination of the defendant's 
subjective willingness to commit a crime that must necessarily occupy 
the courts in applying the predisposition test for entrapment. 
United States v. Dyman, 739 F.2d 762, 768 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985). 
88. The court may find entrapment as a matter of law " 'only when there is undisputed 
testimony which shows conclusively and unmistakably that an otherwise innocent person was 
induced to commit the act.' " United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1434 (lOth Cir. 1988) 
(quoting United States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d 20, 23 (lOth Cir. 1975)). As stated in United States 
v. Lorenzo, 43 F.3d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted) ("Ordinarily, the 
question of entrapment is for the jury to resolve. To find entrapment as a matter of law, there 
must be undisputed evidence establishing both that defendant was induced to commit the crime 
and that he lacked the predisposition to do so."). See also United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 
1430 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1147 (1995); United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 
964 F.2d 993, 1001 (lOth Cir. 1992). . 
89. United States v. Lessard, 17 F.3d 303, 305 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Mkhsian, 5 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
90. United States v. Van Slyke, 976 F.2d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 
States v. Stanton, 973 F.2d 608, 609 (8th Cir. 1992)). 
91. Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085 n.9. 
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III. THE SUPREME COURT TO THE RESCUE 
Since World War II, several entrapment cases have been decided by 
the Supreme Court: two are significant here.92 The two, Sherman and 
Jacobson as discussed previously, are similar in several ways. In each 
case, the government behavior directed at the individual defendant was 
persistent and extended.93 The Court stated in both cases that the 
entrapment issue is normally one of fact for the jury, but ultimately 
found, as a matter of law, that entrapment had occurred.94 In both 
cases, the finding of entrapment resulted in acquittal for the defen-
dants.95 Finally, both opinions initially emphasized the elements of the 
entrapment defense, looking to inducement by the government and 
predisposition by the defendant, but ultimately shifted to broad condem-
nation of the inappropriate actions of the government.96 The language 
in each opinion is harsh and the eventual impact is substantial. 
Chief Justice Warren in Sherman initially discussed the state of mind 
inquiry for the entrapment defense: 
To determine whether entrapment has been established, a 
line must be drawn between the trap for the unwary 
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal .... On the 
one hand, at trial the accused may examine the conduct of 
the government agent; and on the other hand, the accused 
will be subjected to an "appropriate and searching inquiry 
92. Several other cases decided by the Supreme Court during this period were certainly 
of note, though they offer little guidance regarding how to reach a conclusion as to an 
individual's disposition to commit a particular crime. In Hampton and Russell, the Court rejected 
the view that entrapment as a matter of law could occur solely because government agents 
provided ingredients for the manufacture of narcotics. See Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490; Russell, 
411 U.S. at 434-35. In Hampton, government agents supplied the defendant with narcotics which 
they later purchased. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 486-87. In both cases the Court emphasized that the 
major consideration is the defendant's state of mind: Was he disposed to commit the crime prior 
to the government's solicitation? /d. at 490; Russell, 411 U.S. at 434-35. The other entrapment 
case worthy of mention is Mathews, where the Court simply brought the entrapment doctrine 
into accord with the law in other civil and criminal areas by holding that inconsistent defenses, 
including entrapment, could be raised. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 65-66. 
93. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 543-47; Shennan, 356 U.S. at 371. 
94. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554; Shennan, 356 U.S. at 372-73. 
95. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373. 
96. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54; Shennan, 356 U.S. at 373-76. Jacobson, of course, also 
is important because it is the first significant case where no Justices argued the merits of the 
objective test for entrapment. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85. 
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into his own conduct and predisposition" as bearing on his 
claim of innocence.97 . 
Justice White's language in Jacobson is of similar import: 
[The government agent] may offer the opportunity to buy 
or sell drugs and, if the offer is accepted, make an arrest on 
the spot or later. In such a typical case, or in a more 
elaborate "sting" operation involving government-sponsored 
fencing where the defendant is simply provided with the 
opportunity to commit a crime, the entrapment defense is of 
little use because the ready commission of the criminal act 
amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition.98 
217 
In neither case, however, did the majority opinion deal solely with 
a narrow application of the rules regarding the government's inducement 
and the defendant's predisposition. Chief Justice Warren in Sherman 
strongly rebuked the "setup" by the drug officers: 
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of 
entrapment is designed to overcome. The government 
informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not 
only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning 
to the habit of use. Selecting the proper time, the informer 
then tells the government agent. The setup is accepted by 
the agent without even a question as to the manner in 
which the informer encountered the seller. Thus the Gov-
ernment plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and 
beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise 
would not have attempted. Law enforcement does not 
· require methods such as this.99 • 
Consider Justice White's words of condemnation for the Postal Service's 
actions in bringing Jacobson into the criminal justice system: 
Had the agents in this case simply offered petitioner the 
opportunity to order child pornography through the mails, 
and petitioner-who must be presumed to know the 
law-had promptly availed himself of this criminal opportu-
97. Shennan, 356 U.S. at 372-73 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451). 
98. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 549-50. 
99. Shennan, 356 U.S. at 376. 
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nity, it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have 
warranted a jury instruction. 
But that is not what happened here. By the time petition-
er finally placed his order, he had already been the target of 
26 months of repeated mailings and communications from 
Government agents and fictitious organizations. 
Law enforcement officials go too far when they "implant 
in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit 
the alleged offense and induce its commission in order that 
they may prosecute."100 
[Vol. 47 
The central issue is clearly the defendant's state of mind. Yet, both 
these quotes establish that no decision as to predisposition can be made 
without looking fully at the extent of government involvement in the 
criminal enterprise-its inducement activities. The shift in emphasis 
from an exclusive review of the evidence regarding the defendant's state 
of mind to the nature of the improper government inducement is neither 
shielded nor subtle. The Court in both cases reiterated its support for the 
subjective, predisposition test for entrapment. 101 Still, it applied this 
test in context, analyzing the nature of the defendant's mental state by 
exploring the scope of the government inducement. 102 Thus, in both 
cases, the Court concluded that entrapment had been shown as a matter 
of law. 103 
This conclusion is reached not because evidence of predisposition 
was wholly absent-it was present in both cases. 104 Rather, the govern-
ment involvement in the creation of crime was simply too great and the 
evidence of predisposition too weak. 105 The message from Sherman 
100. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550, 553 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442) (emphasis added 
by Jacobson Court) (internal citation omitted). 
101. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372-73. 
102. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-76. 
103. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54; Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373. 
104. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550-51 (noting that Jacobson had become predisposed to 
break the law); Sherman, 356 U.S. at 375-76 (observing that Sherman had a record of two past 
narcotics convictions, one for sales, the other for possession). 
105. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550 (remarking that while Jacobson had become 
predisposed to breaking the law, this predisposition was largely the product of government 
involvement); Shennan, 356 U.S. at 375-76 (regarding Sherman's two prior narcotics convictions 
as insufficient to prove he had a readiness to sell narcotics at the time of the investigation, 
especially in light of the government inducement). In fairness, a review of the government 
involvement has always been present. The entrapment defense has consistently been viewed as 
requiring proof of two elements: lack of predisposition and government inducement. However, 
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and Jacobson rings out clearly: judges are to scrutinize carefully long-
term, intense government operations in order to decide if entrapment as 
a matter of law has occurred. That is, the court must answer the 
question, was it the government which truly designed and nurtured the 
criminal activity? This message has been well understood by judges 
throughout the United States. 
IV . .APPLYING THE DOCTRINE 
The language of the Supreme Court in Sherman and Jacobson signals 
genuine movement from an exclusive focus on the defendant's state of 
mind to a much more searching view of the government's behavior.106 
the review of the government behavior has, traditionally, been fairly minimal. The key inquiry 
has always been into the defendant's mind-set; was she disposed to commit the crime? 
Numerous judges have written that predisposition is the critical element. See United States v. 
Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1433 (lOth Cir. 1988) (predisposition is the "crucial factor''); United 
States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1230 (5th Cir. 1988) (predisposition is the "critical determina-
tion"); United States v. Barry, 814 F.2d 1400, 1401 (9th Cir. 1987) (predisposition is the 
"principal element"). 
106. In Shennan, the analysis of governmental conduct was not at issue. Neither was it 
ignored. The concurring Justices, led by Felix Frankfurter, argued that the Court should have 
explicitly found entrapment because of the government's overreaching, under an objective theory 
of the defense. Shennan, 356 U.S. at 380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Jacobson, on the other 
hand, the dissenters, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, recognized the change in emphasis 
which was taking place, and complained vociferously. They were particularly distressed with the 
requirement that the prosecution's predisposition evidence relate to the time after government 
agents initially contacted the defendant, not simply after they solicited him to commit the crime. 
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 557-58 (O'Connor J., dissenting). In Jacobson, of course, the distinction 
was crucial. The solicitation took place 2 1/2 years after the initial contact and after tremendous 
pressure by government agents. /d. at 550. The dissenters also expressed concern that the 
majority's view "has the potential to be misread by lower courts as well as criminal investigators 
as requiring that the Government must have sufficient evidence of a defendant's predisposition 
before it ever seeks to contact him." /d. at 557 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added by 
J. O'Connor). On this latter point, however, Justice O'Connor was incorrect, at least insofar as 
later cases have interpreted Jacobson. Not a single opinion can be located which holds thai, in 
light of Jacobson, the prosecution needs to show some sort of individualized suspicion prior to 
engaging in an undercover operation. 
As stated in United States v. Kussmaul, 987 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1993): "[T]he 
Government does not need to establish a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before instituting 
a sting operation, since such a requirement would obviate the need to have such operations." 
This holding is well accepted, but its rationale is somewhat curious. Reasonable suspicion is a 
low standard, hardly sufficient to satisfy the warrant requirement of probable cause, or the trial 
mandate of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Law enforcement officers with reasonable 
suspicion could choose to continue an investigation in order· to obtain a warrant or present strong 
evidence for trial. And, the investigation might well entail a sting oper!ltion. Still, the court's 
ultimate conclusion remains virtually unchallenged. See United States v. Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 
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There is now a growing concern by judges throughout the country that 
undue involvement by the government may constitute entrapment even 
where the defendant appeared willing to commit the crime.107 Hence, 
one may conclude that cases such as those mentioned at the start of this 
Article might well come to a different result today than in earlier 
times. 108 Clearly, courts today are far more willing than ever before to 
find entrapment, as a matter of fact or as a matter of law. This finding 
may even be made in cases in which the defendant reacts with relative 
eagerness to the government contact. The key issue today increasingly 
looks to whether the government's actions constituted a long-term, 
99 (lith Cir. 1994) (stating that there is no requirement that the government have evidence of 
predisposition or wrongdoing before initiating an investigation); United States v. Harvey, 991 
F.2d 981, 992 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that the government is not required to show it had 
reasonable cause prior to targeting a suspect for criminal investigation). 
I 07. Which is not to suggest either that prior to Jacobson there had been no important cases 
finding entrapment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant, or that after Jacobson the courts 
invariably found entrapment where there was substantial government involvement. The legal 
terrain is not nearly so smooth. Here, for instance, are strong rulings in favor of the defendant, 
prior to Jacobson: United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674, 686 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The important 
point is not that this conduct by the government agents was necessarily outrageous, but that 
[defendant] was not merely given an opportunity to take or kill an eagle but was encouraged to 
do so by the agents' repeated direct and indirect solicitations over a nearly two-year period.") 
(footnote omitted), rev'd in part on other grounds by United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 
(1986); United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1294 (8th Cir. 1984) (before the government's 
pursuit of the defendant, no showing that he had "engaged in any prior criminal conduct and had 
no record of making or dealing in any firearms-let alone pipe bombs or similar such 
'destructive-device' firearms"); United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(finding the Supreme Court made clear the materiality "of the expressed reluctance of defendant, 
and of the fact that the defendant capitulates or accedes only in the context of repeated 
solicitations by law enforcement agents"). 
The following post-Jacobson cases were resolved against the defendant: United States v. 
Gonzales, 58 F.3d 506,513 (lOth Cir. 1995) (holding an Internal Revenue Service agent did not, 
by offering a compromise containing' a misstatement, entrap defendant into committing the 
offense of attempting to evade taxes because defendant did not have to sign the document); 
United States v. Kummer, 15 F.3d 1455, 1459 (8th Cir. 1994) (affirming drug conviction based 
on evidence of defendant's "apparent previous involvement in drug trafficking and his 
willingness to purchase the cocaine from the informants absent any prodding or inducement on 
the part of the police"); Kussmaul, 987 F.2d at 349 (finding that government's "sting operation 
did not exhibit the persistent and overzealous Government pursuit of a reluctant and 
unresponsive individual over an extended period of time which so offended the Jacobson 
Court"). For a sharp difference of opinion regarding the application of Jacobson, see United 
States v. Pardue, 983 F.2d 835, 842 (8th Cir. 1993) (reversing a district court finding of 
entrapment because the Eighth Circuit found the government's actions to be permissible under 
Jacobson and did not constitute outrageous conduct), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3043 (1993). 
I 08. See infra notes 203-12 and accompanying text. 
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overreaching operation that could overwhelm even an unwilling 
defendant. 
Almost twenty years ago, Judge McGowan of the District of 
Columbia Circuit recognized that inquiry into government behavior was 
crucial in many entrapment cases in order to decide if the subjective, 
predisposition test __ ~ad been met: 
Clearly, one way of proving predisposition is to show that 
the defendant responded affirmatively to less than compel-
ling inducement by the government agent. The limited 
character of the participation in the crime by the agent may 
convince the jury of predisposition on the part of the 
defendant. If, on the other hand, the accused did not 
respond affirmatively until after substantial pressure or 
threats by the government agent, then the prosecution 
generally must introduce additional evidence in order to 
convince the jury of predisposition.109 
The point was made succinctly in one of the ABSCAM cases, United 
States v. Jannotti:110 "The greater the inducement, the heavier the 
government's burden of proving predisposition."111 
The best illustration of this shift toward closer scrutiny of govern-
ment inducement in determining predisposition is the Seventh Circuit's 
en bane opinion in United States v. Hollingsworth.112 In Hollingsworth, 
a dentist and a farmer were convicted of a ·money laundering scheme 
that had been hatched as the result of a government operation.113 The 
two had originally planned to become successful investment bankers and 
created a Virgin Islands corporation to conduct international banking, 
but the business was a failure. 114 Desperate for clients, they began 
placing advertisements in general circulation publications.115 A United 
States customs agent responded to an advertisement in USA Today and 
then began a process of attempting to interest the dentist and the farmer 
109. United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 
966 (1979). 
110. 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982). 
111. Id. at 619-20 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 
511 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
112. 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994). (en bane). 
113. ld. at 1198. 
114. ld. at 1200. 
115. ld. (the advertisement offered to sell an unused foreign banking license). 
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in using the lawful business entity for illegal money laundering. 116 
After more than a year of various transactions between the parties, the 
two bankers were arrested for laundering cash given to them by the 
agent. II? 
While the two were amateurs in the finance world, 118 they were 
extremely anxious to tum a handsome profit and they responded with 
a singular lack of resistance to the agent's plan to use the business to 
launder funds illegally. 119 As stated by the dissenting opinion: 
It is evident from the facts presented at trial that the 
defendants were quite well versed in how to launder money 
and expressed no reluctance at doing so. As the deal 
unfolded and additional details became known ... [the 
defendants] proceeded full-speed ahead expressing an 
interest in laundering larger amounts of cash. . . . The 
defendants' actions are not those of an "unwary innocent" 
but rather those of a [sic] wary criminal. 120 
The dissenters, though, ignore a critical fact. Prior to his contact with 
the defendants, the customs agent had no basis to believe these two 
individuals had previously engaged in illegal conduct or were seeking 
to do so. 121 Indeed, the USA Today notice ad was apparently for lawful 
services. The agent contacted them, though, because he" 'assumed that 
someone who wanted to sell [an unused foreign banking license] would 
possibly be interested in money laundering.' "122 
Judge Posner, writing for the majority, relied heavily on the Supreme 
Court's decision in Jacobson and found that the defendants had been 
entrapped as a matter of law.123 Under Jacobson, it was not enough for 
the government to show merely that the defendants were willing to 
make money unlawfully as a re·sult of the government's instigation. 124 
ll6. /d. at 1200-01. 
117. !d. at 1201. 
118. The opinion referred to them as "tyros." Jd. at 1203. 
119. While the two defendants were willing to engage in the operation, there was no 
evidence that before the involvement of the customs agent that either had contemplated engaging 
in such illegal behavior. !d. at 1202. 
120. !d. at 1210 (Coffey, J., dissenting). 
121. See id. at 1201. 
122. /d. at 1200. 
123. /d. at 1198-1205. 
124. /d. at 1199 ("[The defendants'] willingness to commit the crimes to which the 
government invited them cannot be decisive."). The court was not alone in its view that 
Jacobson required a closer, and altered, analysis. Other circuit courts had previously referred to 
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The issue was· whether the defendants would have engaged in such 
improper behavior without the agent's inducement.125 Judge Posner 
explained: 
The defendant must be so situated by reason of previous 
training or experience or occupation or acquaintances that 
it is likely that if the government had not induced him to 
commit the crime some criminal would have done so; only 
then does a sting or other arranged crime take a dangerous 
person out of circulation. 126 
The majority found entrapment as a matter of law because no 
showing was made that the dentist and the farmer had the practical 
knowledge or background, apart from a willingness, to commit a money 
laundering crime.127 The dissenters rejected this additional element for 
the entrapment defense, which would require an ability to perform the 
illegal act without government assistance.128 For them, the government 
had prevailed against the entrapment defense because it established that 
the defendants were predisposed to commit the crime.129 They were 
relatively eager participants in the agent's laundering plan.130 
The majority, however, was not moved by the eagerness of these two 
novices. Instead, the real concern was ~hether this type of crime would 
" 'the new standard enunciated in Jacobson' " and the fact that the Supreme Court had 
" 'breath[ed] new life into the entrapment defense.' " /d. at 1198 (quoting United States v. 
Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1483 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 
1993)) (alteration in original). Thus, the Hollingsworth court stated that "Jacobson has changed 
the landscape of the entrapment defense." /d. 
125. /d. at 1200. 
126. /d. 
127. !d. at 1202. 
128. /d. at 1214 (Ripple, J., dissenting); id. at 1211-12 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
129. /d. at 1210 (Coffey, J., dissenting); id. at 1212 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
130. The complaint of the dissenters was that the majority gave no explanation why a 
person "who fully desires to break the law and is entirely willing to do 1-Vhat needs to be done 
to accomplish a criminal objective ought be excused from criminal liability simply because, for 
whatever reason, he does not have his act together when afforded an opportunity by an 
undercover agent." /d. at 1216 (Ripple, J., dissenting). In exasperation, the dissenting judges 
lamented that the government now "must also demonstrate that the defendant has sufficient 
'aptitude and equipment to commit the crime and thus poses an immediate danger to society." 
/d. at 1217 (Ripple, J., dissenting). In fairness, the majority did not require the government to 
prove that the defendant poses an inunediate danger, only that he pose some danger. Id. at 1200, 
1203. 
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have been committed without government involvement. 131 No evidence 
was offered to show such a likely offense occurring. 
Obviously [the defendants] were capable of the act. All that 
was involved in the act was wiring money to a bank 
account designated by the government agent. Anyone can 
wire money. But to get into the international money-
laundering business you need underworld contacts, financial 
acumen or assets, access to foreign banks or bankers, or 
other assets. [The defendants] had none .... Even if they 
had wanted to go into money laundering before they met 
[the customs agent]-and there is no evidence that they 
did-the likelihood that [the defendants] could have done 
so was remote. They were objectively harmless. 132 
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the defense had proven entrapment 
because the prosecution failed to present strong evidence that the 
defendants would have gone forward on their own. 133 While entrap-
ment is normally a question for the jury, it can be a matter of law when 
the evidence is strong and demonstrates " 'conclusively and unmistak-
ably that an otherwise innocent person was induced to commit the 
131. !d. at 1200, 1202. 
132. !d. at 1202. In a somewhat similar rebuke of the prosecution's case, the Appellate 
Court of Illinois in People v. Karraker, 633 N.E.2d 1250, 1259 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), reversed the 
conviction of the defendant for unlawfully possessing a weapon after conviction of a felony. 
Again drawing the distinction between willingness to commit a crime and the likely commission, 
the court noted that there had been no showing that the defendant was on the verge of 
committing the crime without the agent's involvement. ld. The court duly chastised the 
government. 
The record shows the State spent an inordinate amount of time, money and energy 
in an attempt to catch the defendant in relatively minor criminal acts. As Justice 
Frankfurter once said, "No matter what the defendant's past record and present 
inclinations to criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the estimation of 
society, certain police conduct to ensnare him into further crime is not to be 
tolerated by an advanced society." 
ld. (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
133. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1202. 
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act.' "134 This standard was the basis for the decision in 
Hollingsworth.135 
The majority opinion in Jacobson has encouraged other courts to 
consider carefully the government's evidence regarding predisposition. 
As a result, many courts have exhibited a willingness, rarely seen 
before, to find entrapment as a matter of law where government 
involvement is extensive.136 Similarly, other courts also have looked 
carefully at government inducement in analyzing predisposition. Such 
a review is not simply to determine whether the defendant was a willing 
or even enthusiastic participant. Rather, the issue has become whether, 
absent governmental involvement, the defendant truly would have 
committed the criminal act. Indeed, cases from other federal circuits 
make the point with force.137 
134. United States v. Madrigal, 43 F.3d 1367, 1369 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting Fadal, 844 
F.2d at 1434). For a good discussion of entrapment as a matter of law, see United States v. 
Theodosopoulos, 48 F.3d 1438, 1444-47 (7th Cir. 1995). Here, the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
trial judge's finding of entrapment as a matter of law. /d. 
135. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199 (explaining that a defendant" 'if left to his own 
devices' " would " 'never run afoul of the law,' " should be entitled to acquittal) (quoting 
Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54). 
136. For a discussion of this willingness to find entrapment as a matter of law on both the 
state and federal levels, see infra notes 137-54 and accompanying text. 
137. State judges, too, have begun in-depth evidentiary reviews to decide how dangerous 
individuals truly are, absent government inducement. The experience in Florida is especially 
illuminating. The line of cases begins with Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90, 101 (Fla. 1993), 
where the Florida Supreme Court found entrapment as a matter of law because there was "no 
evidence whatsoever of predisposition on Munoz's part prior to and independent of the 
government inducement." See also State v. Finno, 643 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) 
(stating "[t]hat the defendant may philosophically or theoretically think that some act should not 
be criminal cannot amount to predisposition to commit the crime"); Beattie v. State, 636 So. 2d 
744, 746 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (finding that in the absence of any predisposition, defendant was 
entrapped into committing the offense of possession of child pornography where defendant 
responded to an advertisement placed by U.S. Customs, engaged in an exchange of ten letters 
with an undercover customs officer, and met with the officer to purchase a child pornography 
videotape); State v. Howell, 629 So. 2d 213, 215 (Fla. 2d DCA· 1993) (where the court 
explained: "In spite of that which may have been taking place in other pawn shops in Pasco 
County, law enforcement had no independent information prior to the expansive sting opemtion 
that Howell or his business ever knowingly purchased stolen property. There is no evidence in 
this record to indicate that [the defendant] was predisposed to commit the charged offense, and 
no one had tipped the sheriffs office that [the defendant] would knowingly negotiate for stolen 
merchandise."). The point is made most powerfully in State v. Ramos, 632 So. 2d 1078, 1079 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1994), where the court wrote: 
[T]he confidential informant had to contact [the defendant] approximately fifteen 
or sixteen times in order to persuade him to commit the offense. Moreover, the trial 
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One example is United States v. Sandoval, 138 in which the court 
made clear that willingness on the part of the defendant to commit the 
solicited crime is not enough to prove predisposition. 139 "Jacobson 
clarified the boundaries of such substituted proof, rejecting it where 
significant and persistent government encouragement was required to 
induce the crime."140 The court compared the facts to those in Jacob-
son: 
The facts of the instant case involve government conduct 
every bit as troubling as that described in Jacobson . ... [I]t 
is clear that the IRS initiated the bribery scheme. . . . It was 
only after Hernandez' persistent requests for a personal 
benefit and the rejection of a reward for information that 
Sandavol considered offering more .... We are persuaded 
that the government originated the bribery scheme, implant-
ed it in Sandavol's mind, and induced him to cooperate. 141 
In Sandoval, the court concluded that the degree of pressure applied by 
the government was too great, 142 and found entrapment as a matter of 
court found that there "was no history, information, or intelligence known to law 
enforcement of any involvement by [the defendant] in any narcotics activities or 
drug 'rip-offs' before the confidential informant brought [the defendant] into the 
scheme." 
Section 777.201 [of the Florida Statutes] provides that the issue of entrapment 
shall be submitted to the trier of fact. However, when the factual issues above are 
not in dispute, "then the trial judge has the authority to rule on the issue of 
predisposition as a matter of law." In the instant case, the factual issues above are 
not in dispute; the issue of entrapment does not have to be submitted to the trier 
of fact. Under the circumstances of this case we find that under the subjective test, 
[the defendant] was entrapped as a matter of law. 
!d. (internal citations omitted). 
138. 20 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 1994). 
139. See id. at 138. 
140. !d. 
141. !d. at 137. 
142. !d. at 138. The court stated: 
The government distinguishes Jacobson, arguing that the government pursued 
Jacobson for 26 months while Sandoval agreed to bribe Hernandez after only one 
meeting. The time involved is less important than the degree of pressure applied. 
Jacobson received seven or eight mailings from the government over the course of 
26 months. Compared to the full-court press utilized in the instant case by Agent 
Hernandez, the government in Jacobson acted with comparative restraint. 
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law .143 It is unmistakable that the Fifth Circuit in Sandoval was 
concerned with the defendant's knowing participation in the criminal 
venture.144 It was just as concerned, however, with a government 
operation which seemed to create this knowing participation through 
carefully directed solicitations. 145 
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Skarie, 146 also was troubled 
by the nature of the government involvement used to demonstrate the 
defendant's likely future commission of a crime. 147 The defendant, 
who never had been convicted of a drug offense, 148 "was attempting 
to kick a prior drug habit,"149 and refused for over two months to 
participate.150 "[l]n the face of repeated requests by the government, 
[she] relented only after the government's agent made a number of 
graphic and violent threats against her and her family."151 The court 
ordered acquittal when the government's evidence of predisposition 
showed a willingness by the defendant only "after the government . . . 
devoted considerable time and effort to persuading the defendant."152 
The court concluded that without such government action the defendant 
would not have committed the crime. 153 Hence, it reached a justifiable 
finding of entrapment as a matter of law .154 
/d. at 138 n.13. 
143. /d. at 137-38. 
144. See id. at 138. 
145. See id. 
146. 971 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1992). 
147. /d. at 320. 
148. See id. at 320-21. 
149. /d. at 321 n.4. 
150. /d. at 321. 
151. /d. 
152. /d. 
153. /d. 
154. /d. A similar result is found in another case, though on an unusual set of facts. See 
United States v. Beal, 961 F.2d 1512, 1518 (lOth Cir. 1992). Drug officers in Utah made a deal 
with an arrested individual who was" ' facing a 1-to-15-year sentence' " so that he would get 
his charges dropped and dismissed if he worked with them in undercover sting operations. /d. 
at 1513. The informant was told to contact people known to him to see whether they were 
engaged in criminal behavior. /d. Based on these instructions, the informant contacted a number 
of persons. /d. at 1514. After seveml attempts, the informant was successful in contacting the 
defendant, Beal. /d. The informant expressed an interest in obtaining drugs from the defendant, 
who, after several calls from the informant, eventually agreed to meet with the informant. /d. 
In the ensuing 24 hours, the defendant participated in two drug tmnsactions. /d. at 1514-15. 
Here the Government behavior was not over an extended period of time, indeed it related 
only to events in a single 24-hour period during which the drug tmnsactions occurred. /d. at 
1516. The problem was that at the trial level, the jury found that the defendant had been 
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V. THE DEFENSE TODAY 
Courts review evidence regarding the entrapment defense much more 
carefully since the Supreme Court's decision in Jacobson. 155 This 
development is a breakthrough of major import. Traditionally, judges 
have not favored the defense and have viewed it with far more 
skepticism than have jurors.156 Still, while judicial scrutiny may be 
entrapped with respect to the first transaction (at the beginning of that 24-hour period) but not 
as to the second transaction. !d. at 1513. However, the trial court, in ruling on a subsequent 
motion for judgment of acquittal, set aside the guilty verdict on the second count. !d. at 1515. 
The court of appeals affirmed and found, as a matter of law, that the government had initiated 
both transactions, that its attitude toward the defendant was persistent, and that there was 
insufficient evidence to demonstrate predisposition as to the second transaction if it could not 
have been shown with regard to the first. /d. at 1516-17. "[T]he discrete acts of the defendant 
were part of the same continuum of events motivated by the same influence." /d. at 1517. More 
to the point, relying on both Sherman and Jacobson, the court adopted the district court's ruling 
on entrapment as a matter of law: 
It does seem to me that this is a case in which there was a strong original 
inducement and that in fact this defendant was preyed upon by the government 
informant to do something that he was not predisposed to do. I think he had his 
weakness played upon, he was beguiled, and it is a matter of logic that the jury 
recognized that and held him to be entrapped on the first charge. 
!d. at 1515 (the issue in Beal raised the question of the applicability to the second charge). 
155. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
156. See Ted Rohrlich, DeLorean Verdict a Quirk, Legal Scholars Believe, L.A. TiMES, 
Aug. 18, 1984, at A I, A27. Certainly the defense has fared better with jurors than with judges. 
See id. The premiere illustration of jurors' positive response to an entrapment claim is the 
acquittal of automaker John Z. DeLorean a decade ago in Los Angeles, see Jay Mathews, 
DeLorean Acquitted of All Eight Charges in Drug-Scheme Trial, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1984, 
at AI, A12, (although the more recent prosecution of now District of Columbia Mayor Marion 
Barry surely runs a close second). DeLorean was captured on videotape toasting a scheme to 
rescue his company with profits from a $24 million cocaine deal, rather strong evidence for a 
drug conspiracy case. /d. Still, the jury reacted harshly to the government's "set up" of the 
defendant, more harshly than judges routinely did at that time. See id. This point was made by 
well known criminal law scholar Charles Whitebread: 
But if DeLorean's jurors had been U.S. Supreme Court justices, deciding his fate 
on purely legal grounds, rather than ordinary lay persons, who are presumably 
more subject to emotionalism, the outcome probably would have been differ-
ent. . . . t 
The justices would probably have taken DeLorean's enthusiasm-displayed on 
videotapes as he and undercover agents discussed a cocaine deal to bail out his 
ailing car business-as conclusive evidence that he was not entrapped into illegal 
conduct, but was rather a willing participant .... 
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greater today, the law of entrapment, established more than half a 
century ago in the federal courts, has not changed and is not likely to 
change in the foreseeable future .. 
Clearly, there will not be a retreat from the subjective predisposition 
test that examines the defendant's state of mind; few courts will replace 
it with the objective, government-involvement test that analyzes the 
behavior of the government. Nor will we see the emphasis move to 
constitutional due process claims in the area. 157 Instead, the entrapment 
Rohrlich, supra, at A27. Professor Whitebread undoubtedly took a proper view of the then 
Supreme Court's entrapment jurisprudence. After seeing quotes from lawyers and jurors in the 
case, one is struck by the jury's correct view of the entrapment defense: DeLorean was found 
not guilty because of government overinvolvement in the scheme and a notion that he never 
would have undertaken an illegal narcotics transaction without the government plan. See David 
Margolick, A Case for DeLorean, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1984 at B6; Mathews, supra, at Al. 
157. Few courts find that convictions must be reversed as a result of a due process 
violation. Dismissals are appropriate only where the government conduct is such that it "shocks 
the universal cause of justice." United States v. Walther, 867 F.2d 1334, 1339 (lith Cir.), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989) (citations omitted). Some judges are nevertheless influenced by due 
process concerns even if reversals are not warranted on that basis alone. See, for instance, the 
statement of the United States Court of Military Appeal in United States v. LeMaster, 40 M.J. 
178, 181 (C.M.A. 1994): 
We hold simply that targeting appellant in this case constitutes improper 
inducement of a servicemember, particularly by other servicemembers. Esprit de 
corps, good order and discipline, and high morale are not, in any way, enhanced 
or maintained by this type of police work. At a minimum, it violates the 
fundamental norms of "military due process" and is the functional equivalent of 
entrapment. 
!d.; see also the separate statement by one judge in United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 782 
n.3 (8th Cir. 1994), discussed infra: "In my view, the reverse sting not only violates due process 
but also leads to corruption within the government itself. Government agents simply should not 
be in the business of selling cocaine or any other drugs." 
The government's involvement also has implications for sentencing. The government 
sometimes acts to boost the culpability level by increasing the amount or type of drugs or 
weapons used in the sting. See United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(government contact chose to purchase "hard" crack cocaine instead of "soft" form); United 
States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1; 3-4 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that in order to succeed on claim of 
sentencing manipulation, defendants must establish extreme and outrageous conduct on part of 
government, not mere initiation of contact, encouragement of conduct, prolonging of conduct, 
or expansion in degree of conduct); United States v. Messino, 55 F.3d 1241, 1256 (7th Cir. 
1995) (finding no sentencing manipulation for increased illegal firearms sales, as the government 
had a legitimate concern about sufficiency of proof from only a single transaction, and especially 
since many other means existed for the government to pursue had it really wanted to enhance 
defendant's sentence); United States v. Shepherd, 857 F. Supp. 105, Ill (D.D.C. 1994) 
(determining sentencing manipulation had occurred when government agent requested defendant 
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defense will, at least in form, remain unchanged and continue to have 
two elements: the inducement of the defendant by the government, and 
the lack of predisposition to commit the crime by the defendant. 
While the form of the test has remained constant, what has changed 
is the manner in which courts are applying it in light of the Supreme 
Court's decisions in Sherman and, especially, Jacobson. The notion of 
predisposition is now properly placed in context. Courts should not 
merely ask whether the defendant was an enthusiastic participant; 
instead, the inquiry should be whether, without the government involve-
ment, the defendant likely would have committed the crime in the 
foreseeable future. This distinction may seem subtle, but it is crucial. By 
examining government conduct, courts now look at the likelihood of 
criminal behavior as opposed to the eagerness of the defendant in 
responding to the solicitation. 158 The point is made powerfully in the 
Hollingsworth case, discussed previously .159 As noted there, Keith 
Jacobson was not a reluctant individual who had to be coaxed into 
buying the dirty magazines at the end of the government operation. The 
Hollingsworth court explained: 
[H]ad the Court in Jacobson believed that the legal concept 
of predisposition is exhausted in the demonstrated willing-
ness of the defendant to commit the crime without threats 
or promises by the government, then Jacobson was predis-
posed, in which event the Court's reversal of his conviction 
would be difficult to explain. The government did not offer 
Jacobson any inducements to buy pornographic magazines 
cook cocaine powder solely to increase defendant's punishment by triggering penalties applicable 
to crack, the purpuse and practice of which was held by the court to be outrageous government 
conduct). 
158. Which, of course, is why the timing for the test is of such significance. If, as 
suggested in the Jacobson dissent, the judge and jurors are to ask about the state of mind at the 
moment of the actual solicitation, Keith Jacobson would have lost. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 
556-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). He prevailed because the majority did not indicate a single 
precise moment of significance for purposes of the predisposition inquiry. Rather, the evidence 
is to be evaluated for the entire period of governmental connection with the defendant, beginning 
with the first approach and ending with the actual solicitation to commit a crime. /d. at 553. In 
Jacobson, that was a 2 112 year period. /d. The government showed a non-reluctant participant 
at the end of this time frame, but could not demonstrate any great inclination "prior to the 
Government acts ... [and] independent of the Government's acts." /d. at 553-54. See generally 
United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 627 (1 Jth Cir. 1995) (stating that "predisposition has a 
definite temporal reference: the inquiry must focus on a defendant's predisposition before contact 
with government officers or agents") (citing Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547 n.2.). 
159. See supra notes 112-35 and accompanying text. 
1995] ENTRAPMENT DEFENSES 
or threaten him with harm if he failed to buy them. It was 
not as if the government had had to badger Jacobson for 26 
months in order to overcome his resistance to committing 
a crime. He never resisted.160 
231 
Thus, the emphasis is not on the defendant's eagerness, but rather the 
danger created by his mental state. Indeed, Justice White, for the 
majority in Jacobson, illustrated this distinction in striking down the 
conviction: "When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the 
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own 
devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts should 
intervene."161 The key phrase there, certainly, is whether the defendant 
is one who, without the government contact, "likely would have never 
run afoul of the law."162 The appropriate question is, therefore, would 
she have done it? We are not to be concerned exclusively with the 
guilty mind of the defendant or, in the abstract, her criminal intent. 
Instead, a court must determine if she probably "would have run afoul 
of the law," or at least run afoul of it in the foreseeable future, without 
the government action. This analysis returns to the original purpose of 
the entrapment defense: that a non-dangerous individual should not be 
punished. This idea can be traced back to the Supreme Court's flrst 
major opinion in the area.163 In Sorrells, the Court relied heavily on, 
and quoted at length, the language of a 1921 Eighth Circuit decision164 
which looks strikingly similar to the comments made above. 
[I]t is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the 
established law of the land to punish a man for the commis-
sion of an offense of the like of which he had never been 
guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently never 
would have been guilty of if the offlcers of the law had not 
inspired, incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to 
commit it.165 
Seemingly, these roots were abandoned or ignored prior to Jacobson. 
As the Hollingsworth court observed: 
160. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1199 (emphasis in original). 
161. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54. 
162. Id. 
163. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
164. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35, 38 (8th Cir. 1921). 
165. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 444-45 (quoting Butts, 273 F. at 38). 
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What is true is that until the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Jacobson, ... the courts of appeals had been 
drifting toward the view . . . , that the defense of entrap-
ment must fail in any case in which ·the defendant is 
"willing," in the sense of being psychologically prepared, to 
commit the crime for which he is being prosecuted, even if 
it is plain that he would not have engaged in criminal 
activity unless inveigled or assisted by the government.166 
[Vol. 47 
The best illustration of this is the short opinion of the Second Circuit in 
United States v. Ulloa, 161 in which the defendant, claiming entrapment, 
argued that the jury should have been instructed as to whether the 
defendant "was not only willing but also ready to commit the crime, in 
the sense of having the present physical ability to do so."168 The court 
disagreed, writing that the "focus of the entrapment inquiry, once 
inducement by the Government is established, is on the defendant's state 
of mind."169 The court emphasized that it had never found "that the 
Government was required to prove readiness . . . to sustain its burden 
in proving predisposition."170 
Ulloa, however, was decided three years before Jacobson. 111 Its 
view of predisposition cannot "be squared" with Jacobson. 172 In 
Jacobson, the defendant's purchase of magazines was the result of a 
twenty-six-month campaign of inducement by the government. 173 Still, 
the defendant showed no reluctance to purchase magazines, a point 
seized upon by Justice O'Connor in her dissenting opinion. 174 Thus, if 
willingness or enthusiasm was the sole or even principal criterion in 
166. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198 (internal citations omitted). 
167. 882 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1989). 
168. !d. at 44. 
169. !d. 
170. !d. 
171. Though even some post-Jacobson opinions offer language similar to Ulloa. See, e.g., 
United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1002 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that, when 
examining the entrapment defense, the "focal point ... centers on the defendant's intent or 
predisposition to engage in the offense rather than the degree of government involvement" and 
that the purpose of the defense is "to protect an otherwise unpredisposed individual from 
government coercion"). See generally United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir.) 
(concluding there was no entrapment as a matter of law because defendant was clearly disposed 
to commit the crimes for which he was convicted as defendant had routinely dealt in drugs 
during the relevant time period), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 217 (1994). 
172. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1198. 
173. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550. 
174. !d. at 554 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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defeating an entrapment claim, Jacobson's conviction should have been 
affirmed. It was not. 
The distinction between a defendant's response to government 
encouragement and the probability of his committing a crime without 
such inducement is at the heart of an entrapment defense. The defense, 
in the subjective, predisposition jurisdictions does not only ensure that 
innocent minded individuals never go to jail. It also mandates that 
criminal punishment is not to be for a guilty mind, but only for a guilty 
action or at least a probability of such an action. The challenge is to 
identify individuals who pose a serious threat to the community without 
government solicitation. Judge Posner stated the matter well: 
If the police entice someone to commit a crime who would 
not have done so without their blandishments, and then 
arrest him and he is prosecuted, convicted, and punished, 
law enforcement resources are squandered in the following 
sense: resources that could and should have been used in an 
effort to reduce the nation's unacceptably high crime rate 
are used instead in the entirely sterile activity of first 
inciting and then punishing a crime. However, if the police 
are just inducing someone to commit sooner a crime he 
would have committed eventually, but to do so in controlled 
circumstances where the costs to the criminal justice system 
of apprehension and conviction are minimized, the police 
are economizing on resources. 175 
If the Seventh Circuit in Hollingsworth is correct, as I believe it to 
be, why until recently have so few judges looked to evidence indicating 
the probability that a particular defendant would commit a crime without 
governmental encouragement? Perhaps the confusion in this area has 
been generated by the numerous references to the entrapment defense 
being created to protect a "law abiding citizen"176 or the "innocent" 
person.177 These references are unfortunate. Instead, attention, and 
legal protection, should be given to the defendant in the entrapment case 
who, absent government involvement, "resists the temptations, which 
175. United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., 
concurring). 
176. See, e.g., Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1004; VanSlyke, 976 F.2d at 1162. 
177. See, e.g., United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Singh, 54 F.3d 1182, 1189 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458, 1467-68 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 584 (1994); State v. Florez, 636 A.2d 1040, 1047 (N.J. 1994). 
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abound in our society today, to commit crimes,"178 a person whom the 
government "beguiles ... into committing crimes which he otherwise 
would not have attempted."179 
The better approach is to apply the tried and true criminal law notion 
of causation to entrapment. This principle asks whether the defendant is 
"a person who, but for the inducement offered, would not have 
conceived of or engaged in conduct of the sort induced."180 Under this 
approach, the government's behavior becomes of paramount importance 
viz-a-viz the defendant's mental state. This strategy is demonstrated in 
both Sherman and Jacobson where each Court asked whether the crime 
resulted from the agent's actions or from the defendant's prior inclina-
tions.181 "Under the subjective test, the basic question is causa-
tion-whether the person's criminal conduct was caused by the creative 
activity of the officer or by the person's own predisposition."182 This 
adoption of the causation principal in entrapment cases has been 
repeatedly emphasized by other courts. The District of Columbia Circuit 
asked: "[D]id the government's behavior go beyond merely offering [the 
defendant] the opportunity to break the law, and if it did, was he so 
predisposed to commit the crime that his predisposition rather than the 
government's action caused the crime?"183 The Alaska Supreme Court 
stated: "The whole doctrine derives from a spontaneous moral revulsion 
against using the powers of government to beguile innocent, though 
ductile, persons into lapses which they might otherwise resist."184 The 
Fifth Circuit also addressed this matter by offering: "The government 
must not lead astray by persuasion or proffered delight even those who 
178. United States v. Evans, 924 F.2d 714, 717 (7th Cir. 1991). 
179. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376. 
180. Evans v. People, 706 P.2d 795, 801 n.6 (Colo. 1985); see also United States v. 
Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that "[a]s a defense to a criminal 
prosecution 'entrapment' means the government's inducing a person to commit a crime who was 
not predisposed to commit it-in other words, who would not have committed it but for the 
particular inducement that the government held out"). 
181. This point again brings to mind Judge McGowan's admonition to look to the 
government inducement in order to evaluate the defendant's state of mind. See supra text 
accompanying note 109. 
182. State v. Foster, 838 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 994 
(1993). 
183. United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
184. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 227 (Alaska 1969) (quoting Judge Learned Hand's 
opinion in United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933)). The court ultimately 
adopted the objective test for the defense. /d. at 231. 
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had some criminal instincts but 'who would normally avoid crime and 
through self-struggle resist ordinary temptations.' "185 
In the last few years, some courts have not moved toward this 
causation approach, claiming that it is not mandated by the Supreme 
Court.186 These courts are wrong; they misread both Chief Justice 
Warren's opinion in Sherman and Justice White's in Jacobson. 
According to the Hollingsworth court, the Supreme Court 
clarified the meaning of predisposition. Predisposition is not 
a purely mental state, the state of being willing to swallow 
the government's bait. It has positional as well as 
dispositional force. The dictionary definitions of the word 
include "tendency" as well as "inclination." ... [It must be 
shown] that it is likely that if the government had not 
induced him to commit the crime some criminal would 
have done so.187 
In accordance with this reasoning, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has 
correctly and succinctly stated the test for establishing preqisposi-
tion. 188 The prosecution must show that the defendant would have 
committed a crime "absent [the government agent's] inducements."189 
Otherwise, as written in the United States v. Hollingsworth panel 
opinion, the person "is not a threat to society and the criminal law has 
no proper concern with him, however evil his thoughts or deficient his 
character."190 
VI. THE SHIFTING SANDS OF mE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
Some lawyers, scholars, and judges will doubt the view put forth 
here and the intense scrutiny it demands of governmental behavior. They 
185. Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165-66 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Sherman, 356 
U.S. at 384 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
186. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 991 F.2d 981, 993 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that 
"Jacobson did not change the law so that when a suspect promptly avails himself of a 
government-sponsored opportunity to commit a crime, that suspect thereafter can successfully 
claim he was entrapped as a matter of law") (emphasis in original). 
187. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200. 
188. State v. Johnson, 511 N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn. App. 1994). 
189. /d. 
190. 9 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir. 1993). Almost 20 years earlier, Judge Hastie asserted in a 
narcotics case that the law enforcement activity must "facilitate discovery or suppression of 
ongoing illicit traffic in drugs. [Otherwise] [i}t serves no justifying social objective." United 
States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083, 1085 (3d Cir. 1975). 
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may wonder why such emphasis is needed, particularly in cases in 
which the defendant seems to demonstrate predisposition by reacting 
quickly and enthusiastically to a limited inducement. Two responses 
address these concerns. First, the process illustrated by Jacobson focuses 
attention on the inducement because it may well demonstrate if the 
defendant, absent government involvement, posed any real threat of 
committing criminal acts. It is difficult to imagine a more appropriate 
inquiry in our criminal justice system than one that examines individual 
culpability and danger. 
Second, such an added emphasis on the government behavior hardly 
imposes an onerous burden on the prosecution. In cases in which the 
inducement is limited or in which the defendant shows no reluctance, an 
entrapment claim will not be taken seriously. Where, however, as in 
both Sherman and Jacobson, the inducement is extreme and extended 
or where the defendant has moved forward with great reluctance, the 
added emphasis on the government's action may reveal a great deal 
about the true origin of the crime. Thus, where an agent simply offers 
once to buy drugs at street value and the defendant quickly prepares for 
the sale, the defense will fail. If, however, the agent had to make 
numerous requests, the defendant was clearly trying to avoid using 
drugs, and there was no evidence of recent criminal behavior by the 
defendant, acquittal will be necessary. 191 
Critics of this approach also may deny that there has been a dramatic 
shift in the application of the entrapment defense as a result of Sherman 
and Jacobson. 192 Such denials, however, ignore the very real impact 
of these opinions on the analysis of the entrapment defense in the 
criminal justice process. Two examples demonstrate the influence of 
Sherman and Jacobson. 
191. These facts, of course, come directly from Shennan. See Shennan, 356 U.S. at 373-76. 
192. See, e.g., Fred W. Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six Decades of 
Entrapment Law and Related Defenses, in Federal Court, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 829, 842 
(1992) (stating that the net effect of Jacobson is to leave the test for entrapment unchanged); 
Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: Towards a More 
Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1083-84 (1993) (asserting 
that while the crux of the Jacobson decision was predisposition, the Jacobson court offered no 
advice to what constitutes this concept); Christopher D. Moore, Comment, The Elusive 
Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1151, 1188 (1995) (arguing 
judicially crafted entrapment policies should be replaced by more limited legislation). 
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In a recent FBI bulletin, a legal instructor at the FBI Academy 
discussed entrapment and Jacobson. 193 He gave the following advice 
to agents planning to initiate undercover investigations: 
[A]lllaw enforcement officers should consider the follow-
ing three points before conducting undercover investiga-
tions. First, while reasonable suspicion is not legally 
necessary to initiate an undercover investigation, officers 
should nonetheless be prepared to articulate a legitimate law 
enforcement purpose for beginning such an investigation. 
Second, law enforcement officers should, to the extent 
possible, avoid using persistent or coercive techniques, and 
instead, merely create an opportunity or provide the 
facilities for the target to commit a crime. Third, officers 
should document and be prepared to articulate the factors 
demonstrating a defendant was disposed to commit the 
Criminal act prior tO government COntact.194 
This sensible advice is not offered because the federal courts have 
adopted a demonstrably different test. Instead, the instructor was 
reacting to concerns about the review judges will give to the agents' 
activities if the defendant claims entrapment. The FBI should be able to 
demonstrate that without its involvement, a defendant would likely have 
committed a crime and thus could not have been entrapped. The 
government can make this showing by proving that its involvement was 
quite limited, that prior to the FBI contact the defendant had a reputa-
tion as a person inclined to commit the criminal act, or that the 
individual's response clearly indicated he had practical knowledge about 
the crime. 
The shift towards examination of governmental actions is also seen 
in the United States Attorney's recent decision to suspend murder· 
conspiracy charges against Qubilah Bahiyah Shabazz, daughter of 
Malcolm X. 195 Because the alleged plot of Shabazz to have Louis 
Farrakhan killed was closely intertwined with the involvement of an 
informant who was a childhood friend, her defense counsel stated that 
its case would be centered almost entirely on the entrapment defense. 
193. Thomas V. Kukura, Undercover Investigations and the Entrapment Defense, FBI L. 
ENFORCEMENT BULL., Apr. 1993, at 27. 
194. !d. at 32. 
195. The suspension of murder conspiracy charges was achieved through a "Pretrial 
Diversion Agreement." See United States v. Shabazz, Crim. No. 4-95-3 (D. Minn.) (on file with 
author). 
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Indeed, the United States Attorney, in explaining the rather remarkable 
disposition of the case, 196 made reference to the central thesis of the 
entrapment defense as put forth in this Article. He said that he made his 
decision "in the belief that [Shabazz] is not presently dangerous."197 
A somewhat odd statement considering he also claimed the defense did 
not have a viable entrapment claim, 198 and that Shabazz was "a woman 
who not only was predisposed to kill Minister Farrakhan, but was 
deadly serious about it."199 The government's decision to divert 
Shabazz from prosecution was made because, "under the proper 
supervision, Ms. Shabazz does not appear to be dangerous" even though 
her claims, according to the prosecuting attorney, "do not amount to a 
legal defense."200 It can be readily assumed that the government 
position was heavily influenced by a potential finding that Shabazz was 
not likely to have initiated a murder plot against Louis Farrakhan 
without the involvement of a questionable government informant.201 
This Article has argued that while the elements of the entrapment 
defense have not been altered, the manner in which those elements are 
being applied has resulted in more careful review of evidence concern-
ing government activity and the defendant's state of mind. This review, 
which is being conducted by judges, attorneys, and law enforcement 
officials, addresses whether an individual would have committed a crime 
without government involvement. This change in the application of the 
test, which is warranted by the Supreme Court's decisions in Shennan 
and Jacobson, marks a shift in the theory of entrapment law. However, 
one can properly ask whether this trend actually changes the result in 
cases where the defendant claims entrapment. Does all this discussion 
over a shifting emphasis really matter? 
At the outset of this Article, I discussed five individuals who, despite 
claiming entrapment, were convicted of various crimes.202 If these 
196. The disposition resulted in an agreement for counseling and a likely dismissal. See id.; 
Malcolm Gladwell, U.S., Shabazz Settle Farrakhan Murder Plot Case, WASH. POST, May 2, 
1995, at AI. 
197. See Statement of United States Attorney David L. Lillehaug, Settlement of United 
States v. Shabazz, May 1, 1995, at 2 (on file with author). 
198. /d. 
199. /d. 
200. /d. 
201. "[T]he informant has what might charitably be called a very checkered past and might 
be pursuing several agendas." /d. For discussions of the case, see genemlly The Troublesome 
Shabazz Case, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 25, 1995, at A22 (describing the government's use of a paid 
informant); Gladwell, supra note 196 (detailing the reasoning behind the dropped charges). 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 1-44. 
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cases were tried today, would the defendants be convicted, or, instead, 
would courts conclude that they had been entrapped, perhaps even as a 
matter of law? Let us consider, again, each of them. 
Tobias, who attempted to manufacture drugs, did not have a pure 
mind. The government involvement with him, though, was overwhelm-
ing. The dissent in Tobias wrote: 
Utilizing the chemicals provided by the DEA and the 
formula provided by the DEA, Tobias attempted to manu-
facture a drug suggested by the DEA. However, the 
agency's encouragement, pervasive influence, and active 
participation did not end there. Still uncertain about how to 
actually make the drug, from April 29 through May 9 
Tobias telephoned the supply company 13 times and his 
wife called on three other occasions to obtain information 
and additional advice concerning the procedure at each 
stage of the manufacturing process. It is undisputed that 
Tobias did not know how to make PCP and that during 
those phone calls the DEA agents instructed him as to each 
step in the process. Agents for the Government, therefore, 
guided the defendant in every stage of the process, from 
inception to termination.203 
Barger, the Hells Angels leader, was undoubtedly a dangerous 
character. Still, it was the government agent who was engaged in 
offering the following inducements: 
approaching Mr. Barger with a fictional plan to blow up the 
Chicago Outlaws' clubhouse; providing an alibi for the 
plan; urging Mr. Barger to talk with the Alaska Hells 
Angels for guidance in a retaliation; and telling Mr. Barger 
that he, [the government agent], was doi~ all the leg work 
in order to encourage Mr. Barger to act. 
Mummert, who needed money to build a new facility for his car 
dealership, also was eager to work with the government agent to receive 
$1.2 million.205 Yet, he was a businessman with no prior criminal 
record and was desperate to receive the needed large sum of money 
(precisely $1.2 million) to save his lawful investment.206 
203. Tobias, 662 F.2d at 390 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
204. Barger, 931 F.2d at 365-66. 
205. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1331-32. 
206. Jd. 
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Musslyn's case, in retrospect, looks strikingly like Jacobson's. He, 
too, was pursued vigorously by the government for a long period of 
time.207 It is true that evidence of other crimes was present against 
him.208 Unlike Jacobson, however, Musslyn was the subject of the 
Postal Service operation for more than five years/09 and was personal-
ly encouraged.210 
Finally, the case against Judge Hunt was hardly powerful. Govern-
ment agents targeted Hunt based only on the unsubstantiated claim of 
a criminal, who offered the judge a bribe but was refused.211 As the 
Fourth Circuit itself noted, it "may readily be conceded that the 
evidence of predisposition is not overwhelming here."212 
Based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Jacobson, I believe that 
each of these five defendants today would have had a strong chance of 
winning his entrapment claim, either as a matter of law213 or with a 
verdict from a properly instructed jury. The above cases depict 
individuals either unlikely to commit the crime without government 
inducement, incapable of completing the charged crime, or unwilling to 
finish the criminal endeavor. In each case the government vigorously 
pursued the defendant and often handled most of the activities involved 
in the criminal planning. 
These examples are not oddities selected simply to demonstrate that, 
on the fringes, the changing entrapment defense might ·only affect a 
small number of bizarre cases. Rather, these fact patterns represent fairly 
typical entrapment scenarios involving common types of undercover 
operations. They also demonstrate the FBI instructor's sound advice: in 
order to conduct intensive, long-term operations successfully the 
government should be able to offer evidence of the defendant's criminal 
purpose before any government contact and of the defendant's likely 
future criminal behavior.214 Moreover, such evidence will not necessar-
ily be inferred from an enthusiastic response of an embittered gang 
leader like Barger or an embattered businessman like Mummert. 
207. Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 945-46. 
208. /d. at 946. 
209. See id. Jacobson was pursued for half that period. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550. 
210. Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 946. 
211. See Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1080. 
212. /d. at 1086. 
213. After all, the Supreme Court did not send the case back for further proceedings in 
Jacobson. It held that the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law and that the issue 
never should have been sent to the jury. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 554. The result was the same in 
Sherman. See Sherman, 365 U.S. at 373. 
214. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
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If these five cases would truly end in acquittals or directed judgments 
today, should this outcome make an observer of the criminal justice 
system feel uncomfortable? Not at all. The lesson of Sherman and 
Jacobson is that courts should carefully analyze the evidence of 
government involvement, even though the principal entrapment element 
is predisposition. Judges and juries should evaluate the likelihood of 
criminal behavior, not just whether the defendant was a relatively 
enthusiastic participant in the enterprise. The government inducement of 
Sherman was not overbearing and relentless.215 In contrast, Jacobson 
did respond quickly to a solicitation and there was at least some 
evidence of predisposition.216 Still, with strong language the Supreme 
Court struck down both convictions, finding entrapment as a matter of 
law.217 Without government solicitation these defendants would not 
likely have committed the crimes. 
Vll. CONCLUSION 
We should not be overly concerned with the consequences of a more 
stringent application of the entrapment test. Still, the Supreme Court's 
protective view of the entrapment defense may make it more difficult 
for the government to engage individuals in long-term operations.218 
To be sure, this view of entrapment may prohibit law enforcement 
techniques which, I suspect, most people assume are already forbidden. 
That is, agents may not be able to become so involved in the criminal 
enterprise that they, in essence, operate it. Officers may not be able to 
plant the idea of crime in the mind of the citizen and then ensure its 
fruition by a process of detailed instructions to that citizen. Moreover, 
the government may not be permitted to conduct an operation in which 
the individual is targeted over a very long period of time and then only 
solicited to commit a crime at the end of the extensive investigation. 
If the current application of the entrapment defense results in these 
limitations, such a development should be applauded. These limitations 
do not impose undue restrictions on the government's investigation of 
215. See Shennan, 365 U.S. at 373-76. 
216. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542-44 (explaining that Jacobson enrolled in the American 
Hedonist Society shortly after being contacted by the Government, and that he also had a 
predisposition for ordering sexually-oriented magazines, as he had done so a year prior to 
contact). 
217. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
218. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. Indeed, there will be some who will 
argue that such an application will invariably lead to the sort of pre-investigative individualized 
suspicion which the courts have consistently declined to adopt. I disagree. See supra note 106. 
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criminal activities. Consider, for instance, the five defendants discussed 
previously. Each was convicted after his entrapment claim was rejected. 
Today, however, each would have a greater chance of prevailing on the 
defense. In all the cases, however, law enforcement could have curtailed 
any criminal activity without entrapping the suspects. 
In the Barger case, the agent did not need to plan the Hells Angels' 
retaliation. He could have left the initiative to Barger, in order to 
determine if he truly would have attempted the bombing. Similarly, the 
undercover officer did not have to speak with Tobias on thirteen 
different occasions about the manufacture of drugs. Afterall, if Tobias 
could not figure out the process after being provided with the materials, 
he probably was not that much of a risk. Judge Hunt was pursued on the 
word of two criminals eager to make a· deal with prosecutors.219 
Certainly, the government agents could have investigated further, had 
less direct contact with the judge, and made initial inquiries to ascertain 
his reactions. Mummert was a desperate man, in need of $1.2 million to 
save his car dealership.220 He was offered exactly the amount he 
needed, and prompt payment in exchange for engaging in criminal 
activity. The government could still have justified its operation to 
determine if he would look to other criminal actions to get the necessary 
money by giving him less than he needed. As for Musslyn, one might 
well ask why the pursuit took five years and why an officer had to meet 
personally with him in a bar to discuss pornographic materials.221 If he 
was a threat, surely something less intense and dramatic would have led 
the government to conclude that Mummert was an individual likely to 
commit a crime even without the agent's involvement. 
Detecting crime can be a perilous endeavor. The very process of 
undercover operations can encourage law enforcement to go beyond 
investigation of crime and become intertwined in the commission of the 
crime. As a result, the entrapment defense exists to draw a fine line 
between the detection and the creation of crime. Ultimately, though, the 
entrapment defense was created not simply to curb undue government 
behavior, but also to determine if the defendant was truly a threat to 
society. Therefore, officers and agents are required, under the entrap-
ment doctrine, to ensure that without official government inducement, 
an individual would have committed the criminal act within the 
foreseeable future. 
219. See Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1080. 
220. See Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d at 1331. 
221. See Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 946. 
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It has repeatedly been written that simply offering the opportunity to 
commit a crime is not entrapment.222 It is difficult to disagree with that 
view. But, and this is the principal concern, it is not merely "an 
opportunity" when the inducement extends over a tremendously long 
period of time, when the officers seek out desperate individuals and play 
to their particular needs, or when the agents themselves become the 
major architects of the criminal operation. In such situations, unless 
there is strong evidence of other criminal activity by the suspects, the 
government has entrapped them. At a minimum, the government 
involvement casts grave doubt over whether this person would have 
committed a crime without such extensive involvement. 
The tougher application of the entrapment defense will have limited 
impact on the majority of undercover operations. In many cases, law 
enforcement officers have excellent, and well documented, reasons for 
initiating the undercover investigation process. To be sure, when 
challenged by defense counsel, the government is able to offer ample 
evidence of a defendant's criminal behavior and desire to continue to 
engage in illegal activity. The well publicized prosecution of "Holly-
wood Madam" Heidi Fleiss is just such a case.223 Police officers there 
posed as businessmen and used the services of Fleiss' exclusive 
prostitution enterprise.224 At trial she raised an entrapment defense 
which was soundly rejected.225 The judge, in sentencing her to three 
years in prison, alluded to the government's substantial proof of Fleiss' 
ongoing, illegal ring by stating, "[t]his was a highly sophisticated and 
lucrative criminal enterprise."226 With Fleiss, the police had done an 
extensive early investigation and were able to show convincingly that 
she had organized a business that was engaged in acts of prostitution 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 63 F.3d 1067, 1071 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
the proffer of an opportunity alone does not support the defense of entrapment); see also United 
States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (lst Cir. 1994) (explaining that "[a]n 'inducement' consists 
of an 'opportunity' plus something else- typically, excessive pressure by the government, upon 
the defendant or the government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of 
motive") (emphasis in original). 
223. See Hollywood Madam Is Sentenced to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1995, at A18. 
224. /d. 
225. See Nora Zamichow, Fleiss Jury Hears Final Arguments, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1994, 
- at Bl. 
226. Hollywood Madam Is Sentenced to Prison, supra note 223. On appeal, her 
conviction-in an unpublished opinion-was reversed on the ground of jury misconduct. No 
mention was made of the entrapment defense. People v. Fleiss, Super. Ct. No. BA 083380 (May 
28, 1996). 
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and would have continued without the officers' participation.227 She 
227. See Zamichow, supra note 225. In somewhat more usual prosecutions the government 
often has little difficulty demonstrating the likelihood of illegal action by the defendant. As 
stated by the Second Circuit: 
Arguably there is some evidence of inducement, given that a government agent and 
an informant contacted [the defendant] with respect to the drug transactions. The 
government, however, presented uncontradicted evidence that [defendant] was 
predisposed to commit the crime. The government demonstrated that [defendant] 
was dealing and negotiating with [a government informant] prior to the time that 
[the informant] agreed to cooperate with the authorities. Moreover, there was ample 
proof that [the defendant] had been involved in drug dealing prior to any 
involvement with a government agent or informant. [The defendant] offered no 
evidence to rebut this showing of predisposition. 
United States v. Hurtado, 47 F.3d 577, 585 (2d Cir. 1995). 
In the widely publicized terrorism conspiracy trial of Egyptian Sheik Omar Abdel Rahmen 
and nine co-defendants, the defense raised questions of over-involvement by the F.B.I. John L. 
Goldman & Robert L. Jackson, Sheik, 9 Others Guilty in N.Y. Terrorism Plot, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 
2, 1995, at AI. The informant, a former Egyptian army officer, was allegedly allowed to "set 
up" the defendants on a path of crime with little supervision from the F.B.I. !d. at Al2. The 
evidence, however, demonstrated that the informant had secretly taped more than one hundred 
hours of conversations with the defendants, and videotapes showed the defendants mixing 
explosives and advising each other about how to obtain bomb detonators. !d. In another fact 
setting, the government also proved prior criminal intent on the part of the defendants. See Ron 
Seely, Lake Perch Poacher Is Sentenced, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 30, 1995, at 1A. In this government 
operation, agents of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service created an undercover wholesale 
company in an elaborate scheme to nab fish poachers. See id. However, unlike in some of the 
cases discussed in this Article, the defendants in the poaching scheme were merely given an 
opportunity to sell the fish to the agents. !d. Video cameras showed several of the defendants 
coming to the operatives to sell their illegal fish. !d. 
Yet another recent case involved a long-term undercover operation of factories, warehouses, 
and shops in New York City. See George James, Agents Raid Production Lines in Queens for 
Fake Labels, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 28, 1995, at B3. Customs agents pursued a Korean organized 
crime ring which was manufacturing goods overseas for sale in the United States under 
counterfeit labels. !d. The three-year investigation, "Operation Pipeline," was only initiated after 
a private company, Chane!, approached Miami customs officers with substantial information 
about the on-going counterfeiting project. !d. The undercover customs agents pretended they 
could facilitate the importation of counterfeit merchandise into the United States without seizure 
by Customs officials. !d. 
See generally United States v. Aikens, 64 F.3d 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1995) (concluding that the 
evidence, instead of demonstrating inducement by the government contact, in fact showed that 
defendant possessed great skill and sophistication in effectuating the narcotics sale, which 
precluded a finding of entrapment); United States v. Brown, 43 F.3d 618, 625 (11th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that defendant's predisposition to smuggle drugs, based on defendant initiating 
transaction, defendant's eagerness to meet a big-time dealer played by an undercover agent, and 
a lack of reluctance to participate combined with defendant's admission of involvement in prior 
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was not entrapped. 
With long-term investigations, intensive operations, or tremendous 
incentives to commit crime being offered, government investigators 
ought to be able to point to more than a willingness, or even an 
eagerness, on the part of the defendant to participate in the crime. 
Instead, the prosecution must show that even without the government 
involvement the person would have been likely to commit a crime in the 
foreseeable future. This result strikes the proper balance between careful 
investigation by the government, and the creation of unlawful behavior. 
In his strong dissent in one of the earliest entrapment decisions, 
Justice Brandeis anticipated the issue that has become even more 
pronounced today.228 The question then, as now, was how courts were 
to identify the true criminal once the government was heavily involved 
in the illegal enterprise.229 He argued against allowing prosecutions 
where the defendant was not shown to be dangerous without government 
involvement.230 Almost seven decades later, courts are increasingly 
following the advice he gave in his dissent: 
The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the 
alleged crime was instigated by officers of the Government; 
that the act for which the Government seeks to punish the 
defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspiracy to induce 
its commission. The Government may set decoys to entrap 
criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime and 
then punish the criminal, its creature.231 • 
The post-Jacobson scrutiny of the entrapment defense and govern-
ment inducement helps greatly in determining that such government 
provocation or creation has not occurred. That is the purpose of the 
entrapment defense, a purpose worthy of strong support. 
smuggling activities, was sufficient to defeat an entrapment defense); United States v. Smith, 802 
F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant's lack of reluctance to participate in a 
narcotics transaction, his prior history and reputation as a drug user and dealer, and his 
possession of marked DEA money, were sufficient for jury to reject an entrapment defense). 
228. See Casey v. United States, 276 U.S.-413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
229. ld. at 421 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
230. ld. at 423-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
231. ld. at 423 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
